Welcome!

I am a PhD Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, specializing in American Politics.

I am on the 2025-26 academic job market.

My research examines how strategic considerations shape American partisans’ responses to democratic backsliding. My dissertation analyzes when voters and partisan activists confronted with threats from opponents choose compromise rather than escalation. I also study crossover voting in primary elections, depolarization initiatives, and the role of norms in structuring intra-party competition—from presidential primaries to conflicts over free speech. More broadly, I investigate how the heightened stakes of contemporary politics generate complex strategic behavior among the American public. Methodologically, I combine survey and field experiments with elite interviews and descriptive data analysis.

My research has been supported by the Center for Effective Lawmaking, the Columbia Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences, the Columbia Center for Political Economy, the Institute for Humane Studies, the Stanford Polarization and Social Change Lab and the Civic Health and Institutions Project. I am grateful also to the civic society organizations with whom I have collaborated on experiments.

Published and Forthcoming Papers

1. Encouraging Crossover Voting in Presidential Primaries (with Hayley Cohen).
   American Journal of Political Science. 2026. Forthcoming.
2. Reproducibility and Robustness of Economics and Political Science Research (with Abel Brodeur, Derek Mikola, Nikolai Cook, and many, many others).
   Nature. 2026. Forthcoming.
3. The Court of Public Opinion: The Limited Effects of Elite Rhetoric about Prosecuting Political Leaders (with Andrew O’Donohue).
   PNAS Nexus. 2025.
4. Congressional Town Halls (with Andrew J. Clarke).
   Legislative Studies Quarterly. 2024.
5. Foreign Aid and the Status Quo: Evidence from Pre-Marshall Plan Aid (with Austin Strange and Dustin Tingley).
   The Chinese Journal of International Politics. 2019.

Chapters in Edited Volumes

1. Donald P. Green, Thomas Leavitt, and Daniel Markovits. 2023. “Challenges That Proprietary Research Poses for Meta-Analysis.” In Oxford Handbook of Engaged Methodological Pluralism in Political Science, eds. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Dino P. Christenson, and Valeria Sinclair-Chapman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Donald P. Green and Daniel Markovits. 2025. “Field Experiments in Political Science.” In Encyclopedia of Experimental Social Science. Forthcoming.

Working Papers (Drafts Complete)

• Does Fear of Retaliation Constrain Support for Democratic Backsliding? Winner of the Abacus Data Best Poster Award at the 2025 Toronto Political Behavior Workshop [Working Paper] (Job Market Paper)
  Abstract

  Can fear of the opposing party’s retaliation deter support for anti-democratic behavior? In contemporary American politics, partisans express fear that their opponents will violate democratic norms. In theory, this type of belief can reinforce support for democracy if voters subscribe to a logic of deterrence and believe that opponents violate democratic norms only if first provoked. In prediction experiments (n = 7,000; 26,000 predictions), partisans anticipate retaliation but of modest scale—less than a 10% increase in violation probability. Warnings about retaliation modestly but consistently reduce support for rule distortions (n = 5,500). I argue that deterrence reasoning can promote democratic restraint even absent strong principled commitments.

• Use Your Inside Voice: Intra-Party Social Pressure and the Avoidance of Political Speech (with Patrick Liu) [Working Paper] ( Revise and Resubmit, American Journal of Political Science )
  Abstract

  Citizens increasingly report censoring their political beliefs to avoid social backlash from their in-group, yet research on partisanship largely ignores this dynamic, focusing solely on cross-party conflict. This oversight obscures a critical question: is self-censorship driven by partisan norms policing dissent or a general aversion to conflict that silences loyalists and dissenters alike? Using a nationwide survey experiment conducted during the 2024 primaries (N = 17,691), we find that partisans overestimate the likelihood of social sanctions for expressing their views. Experimentally correcting these exaggerated fears significantly reduces self-censorship for both loyalists and dissenters. However, a gap persists: after correction, dissenters remain less willing than loyalists to discuss their preferences with co-partisans. Our findings suggest that while both minorities and majorities face social pressure, minorities possess fewer positive motivations to share their beliefs. Reconciling the competing perspectives on intra-party social pressure offers important insights into partisan identity, polarization, and voter behavior.

• Field Testing Depolarization Initiatives (with Aaron Christensen and Andrew Thompson) [Working Paper] (Under Review)
  Abstract

  A field test of a bipartisan depolarization initiative shows durable reductions in beliefs that opponents reject democracy, but no change in anti-democratic attitudes. Compliance varied substantially by partisanship.

• Cheating to Win? Beliefs about the Effectiveness of Democratic Transgressions (Dissertation Chapter)
  Abstract

  Using an incentivized prediction experiment before the 2024 election, I show Americans believe democratic violations shift outcomes roughly as much as a large spending advantage. Democrats view Republican violations as more effective than Republicans do. Voters do not believe their side’s violations are especially effective, and they fail to distinguish between rule changes and threats to officials.

• Balancing Act: Can Voters Pre-Emptively Restrain Presidential Policy-Making? (with Cody Prosperini) [Working Paper]
  Abstract

  In a repeated-measures experiment (N = 2,900), we test anticipatory balancing mechanisms. Voters engage in modest balancing only under extreme certainty scenarios, suggesting balancing is possible but limited.

• Learning from the Lie: What Anti-Democratic Proposals Teach Voters about Candidates (with Patrick Liu and Carlo Prato)
  Abstract

  Democratic violations signal extremity and resolve. A formal model and survey experiments show that, depending on informational context, unpopular anti-democratic proposals can increase or decrease candidate support.

• Crossover Voting in Congressional Primaries (with Hayley Cohen) [Working Paper]
  Abstract

  Across four preregistered experiments, we show crossover voting is norm-constrained but mobilizable, and crucial for primary reform to reduce polarization.

• Democratic Norms in Nominating Contests (with Hans Noel)
  Abstract

  We examine voter and elite beliefs about party involvement in nominations, including reactions to Biden’s 2024 withdrawal. Voters express strong skepticism of elite intervention.