Crossover Voting in Congressional Primaries

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Abstract

Scholars express widespread concern about the pressure primary elections place on candidates to adopt ideologically extreme positions. Yet, in at least 17 open primary states, swathes of ideologically diverse voters are eligible to participate in primaries of parties with which they do not identify. This behavior remains rare, even as many elections are only competitive in the primary, leaving voters not of the dominant party without a say in the decisive electoral contest. Why? We propose three explanations. First, voters believe that participating in opposing party primaries goes against their affective partisan instincts and their understanding of democratic norms. Second, the set of candidates running in primaries may not be sufficiently appealing to opposing partisans to motivate crossover voting. Third, campaigns may not make efforts to encourage crossover voting. Across four preregistered survey and field experiments, we find support for all three mechanisms and show that it is feasible to encourage crossover voting in both survey experimental and real-world contexts - and that circumstances of elections dramatically affect voter propensity to crossover. We argue that this hitherto unusual form of voter behavior is necessary for institutional primary reforms that seek to reduce the polarizing pressure of partisan primaries to realize their goals, and is a key path for voters opposed to the majority party in single-party districts to make their vote count.

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Introduction

Observers of contemporary American politics often blame congressional primaries - and the perverse accountability they produce - for baleful outcomes from polarization to the erosion of democratic norms. Primaries also increasingly present a large enfranchisement problem in modern U.S. politics. In 2024, 62% of congressional general elections had a partisan advantage of more than ten percentage points and were considered "safe" for one party (Cook Political Report). As a result, over half the country's congressional seats are effectively decided in the primary of the advantaged party, as the advantaged party's nominee is almost sure to win the general election. In a third of those "safe" seats, voters registered with the disadvantaged party (or any other minor parties) could not vote in these decisive primaries because of restrictions on primary voting. Looking at 29 states with party registration, 17.1 million voters live in "safe" seats with closed primaries, are registered with a disadvantaged or minority party, and so are barred from voting in the race that de facto elects officials. An additional 4.7 million voters registered with minority or disadvantaged parties live in safe districts with semi-open primaries, still barred from voting in the advantaged party's primary. In other safe districts, "open primaries" have made voters of all types eligible to vote in any primary.

But what is striking about primaries elections is that drastically different institutional arrangements have not alleviated either of these problems. There is little convincing evidence that changing the rules of the game substantially shifts the ideological outcomes of primaries nor the overall turnout rates. Boatright (2024) argues that there is "likely little that can be done to improve primaries" and that the promise of institutional reforms is often overstated. Hirano and Snyder (2019) call into question whether the advent of mass primaries meaningfully shifted outcomes from those produced when party elites controlled nominations, a far more drastic distinction than contemporary debates about eligibility rules. Even more optimistic accounts of primary reform emphasize modest effects. Micatka et al.

(2024) finds, using a national voter file, that shifts to open primaries increase turnout but do so by incremental margins despite radically expanding the eligible electorate. Meanwhile, Thornburg (2023) uses a synthetic control method to show that shifts to semi-closed primary eligibility rules modestly affect patterns of partisan registration.

These findings are remarkable given that most popular primary reforms - shifting to open or semi-closed primaries - dramatically expand the pool of eligible voters compared to closed primaries. This contrast is even more striking if we adopt party-elite controlled processes as a reference point where selectorates are restricted to narrow pools of party elites. Open primaries allow swathes of voters who do not identify as a member of a party to vote in that party's primary. This includes self-identified partisans of the opposing party. In other contexts in American history, changes to the pool of eligible voters produced dramatic shifts in outcomes, as in analyses of the advent of women's suffrage (Lott and Kenny, 1999) and the *de jure* expansion of the electorate to include Black Southerners after the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Cascio and Washington, 2014).

The perplexity of these null and small effects is magnified when we consider the identity of newly eligible voters. Institutional reforms may have little effect if the preferences of newly eligible voters are similar to previously eligible groups. But we know from ample evidence this is not the case between self-identified Democrats and self-identified Republicans, especially following several decades of ideological sorting Fiorina et al. (2008); Levendusky (2009).

We consider *why* these drastically different pools of eligible voters do not transform outcomes. Why don't substantial changes to the eligible electorate appear to have large effects on the results of primary elections?

We argue that proponents of primary reforms and researchers looking for the effects of such reforms are missing a key step: voter turnout behavior. Though institutional reforms expand the universe of *eligible voters*, those newly eligible voters must turn out to a

different primary than they would otherwise to change the *realized* primary electorate, and subsequently change primary outcomes. Therefore, the limited effects of primary reforms require understanding why voters do not "crossover vote," or vote in opposing party primary elections for which they are eligible, and, if we seek to ameliorate the problems referenced above, what might reduce these rates of abstention.

And current evidence suggests these would-be crossover voters who are eligible to vote in the primary of the opposing party do not take advantage of their eligibility. While it can be difficult to make estimates from the voter file[1] We could not find an estimate from polling that put the routine incidence of crossover voting at more than 10% of eligible voters in polling. Similarly, crossover voters make up a small share of total primary electorates.

We identify three contextual and behavioral factors that might keep would-be crossover voters from turning out. First, psychological factors; whether eligible voters see crossover voting is legal and normatively acceptable. Second, circumstantial factors; whether any candidates running in the opposing party's primary differ from one another such that eligible voters find one preferable to another, and whether the parties' chances in the general election make mitigating the risk of an opposing partisan winning office more urgent than maximizing one's own party's chances of winning the general, or voting in one's own party's primary for other offices. Third, we consider the actions of campaigns and related electioneering efforts: are they able to encourage crossover voting? Do they?

To explore both why voters do not crossover at high rates and if they could be induced to do so, we use four preregistered survey and field experiments to vary the circumstances and enticements to crossover vote. We find support for all three reasons primary voters refrain from turning out to the opposing party's primary and show that these same

[1]Because we are interested in the self-identification of voters which is not available in administrative records, especially in states without party registration which are often states that have open primaries. Individuals who *look* like crossover voters may instead be sincere party switchers, such that voting in the Democratic Primary in one cycle and the Republican Primary the next reflects a change in sincere partisan self-identification. However, we might assume the share of voters in this category is bounded by the relatively minimal portion of party-switchers between any given pair of elections (Green et al., 2004).

voters *can* be encouraged to crossover vote in some circumstances.

Efforts to mobilize novel crossover voting behaviors, rather than further institutional reforms, offer solutions to the often-posited pathologies of primaries.

First, higher levels of crossover voting would yield better representation for the millions of voters who previously only voted in minority party primaries and uncompetitive general elections. Not only will crossover voting mean these voters hold sway over who their elected officials are, but crossover voting will also lead to better continued representation for these voters, as elected officials are more responsive to primary electorates than general electorates (Anderson and Harbridge-Yong, 2023).

Second, if crossover voters voted for their sincerely preferred candidate in the opposing party's primary, it would shift the ideological median of primary electorates and transform the incentives faced by candidates, providing a heretofore unexplored path to victory for moderate primary candidates. This result is specific to crossover voting, rather than newly-eligible independents voting in semi- or fully open primaries. As independents act increasingly like their partisan counterparts (Smidt, 2017), their support for moderate candidates may not surpass that of a closed primary electorate. Meanwhile, opposing partisan crossover voters demonstrate a larger appetite for moderate opposing party candidates. Mobilizing even a small segment of possible crossover voters could change primary outcomes. This is especially true for competitive primaries with many candidates, where the plurality of the vote to win the primary might be as low as 25%. Crossover voters could make the difference between winning and losing.

Evidence on Crossover Voting

There is a small and circumscribed academic literature on crossover voting in primary elections. This scholarship mostly uses exit polls to measure the percentage of crossover voters,

struggles to distinguish between hedging (supporting the moderate in the opposing primary) and raiding (supporting the extremist in the opposing primary), and is mostly focused on elections before 1988.

A persistent challenge of this literature is disagreement over the conceptual definition of crossover voting and how to identify crossover voting from survey and administrative data. Especially in less polarized times, it is possible that voters would have supported, or seriously considered supporting, a moderate out-partisan in the general election if the opposing primary nominated them, which complicates which party a voter "opposes" and therefore if the voter can be seen as crossover voting. Broadly, we can think about *weak* and *strong* forms of crossover voting. A weak crossover voter supports a moderate candidate in the opposing party primary that she would at least consider supporting in the general election. Meanwhile, a strong crossover voter is not a "floating voter" Smidt (2017) and would not vote for the opposing party under any outcome of either party's nominating contests. These definitions extend to variation in response to one's own party primaries, a voter who would support any opposing nominee if and only if his party nominates an extremist, is a weak crossover voter.

Because of disagreements around definitions of crossover voting, this literature also lacks consensus on how much crossover voting happens, with estimates that crossover voters make up between 3 and 20% of the primary electorate. Ranney (1972) and Adamany (1976) study presidential primaries in Wisconsin and find extensive evidence of crossover voting; between 15 and 30% of votes cast in Wisconsin presidential primaries in 1964, 1968 and 1972 were by crossover voters. These estimates were so large that these authors argue that crossover voting may have altered the margins of victory. Studying the same elections, though, Hedlund (1977), and Hedlund et al. (1982) find that only 6% of primary votes were crossover votes. Raney and Adamany count pure independents who vote in a partisan primary and partisan identifiers who vote in the opposing party's primary as crossover voters

while Hedlund and his co-authors only count the latter. But even looking at only partisan identifiers, estimates vary. Abramowitz et al. (1981) find that 20% of votes in the 1977 Virginia Democratic gubernatorial primary were crossover Republican voters. In the 1998 California blanket primary, about 15% of partisans planned to crossover (Cain and Gerber, 2002). Burden and Jones (2009) sum up these varying estimates: crossover partisans make up between 3% and 20% of the primary electorate.

While estimates about the extent of crossover voting varies, scholars agree that crossover rates vary along three main factors: the relative competitiveness of partisan primaries, the size of a party's advantage in a district or strength, and the strength of an individual voters' partisanship. Kousser (2002) finds that crossover rates in California's 1998 gubernatorial and senatorial primaries are higher in the advantaged party's primary and when only one primary is competitive. Alvarez (2002), studying 1998 state assembly races in California, concurs: in one party districts, up to a quarter of the votes in the advantaged party's primary are crossover voters. When a district is competitive in the general election, at most 10% of primary votes are crossover votes. Wekkin (1988) finds that weak partisans and party-leaning independents crossover at similar rates in the 1980 Wisconsin presidential primary, and do so at about double the rates of strong partisans. Sides et al. (2002) find a similar thing in California; weak partisans and those who are ideologically out of step with their own party are more likely to crossover vote. Wekkin also finds more crossover voting in the more competitive primary; in the 1980 Wisconsin presidential primary, 40% of weak Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents voted in the Republican primary, while around 10% of weak Republicans and Republican-leaning independents voted in the Democratic primary. These contextual and individual factors may help make sense of wide ranging estimates of crossover voting.

Despite drastically changing partisan dynamics in the electorate over the last two decades, this literature has rarely been updated. For example, diminished ticket splitting

and the reduced general election importance of candidate characteristics beyond partisanship (Smidt, 2017; Dancey et al., 2023) means that "strong" crossover voting, that is voting in the opposing party's primary with little possibility of supporting the opposing party in the general regardless of the nominee, is the route most available to today's voters. While some voters might engage in "weak" crossover voting, vote for one party in the general if a certain primary candidate was nominated and another party otherwise, such behavior is now rare. For example, Mummolo et al. (2021) highlights that partisan loyalty in congressional elections extends to cases where voters agree with an opposing party candidate on up to 3 issues. Existing studies focus on crossover voting in a different, and lower stakes, partisan environment and as such, we struggle to relate past work to the behavior of crossover voting today. What's more, even as elites intervene more often in the opposition's primary at the congressional and presidential level (for example the intervention studied in (Markovits and Cohen, 2025)), no work directly tests whether the incidence of crossover voting can be changed with elite prompting. To our knowledge, no research has experimentally tested the barriers modern partisans face to crossover voting in congressional elections and the effect of encouragements on voters' expressed willingness to participate in congressional opposing party primaries.

Why Not Crossover Voting?

Why do large portions of partisan voters forgo the opportunity to vote in (what is often) the election that effectively decides their representation? We believe there are three categories of explanation: norms and identity, the candidates and strategic calculus of individual elections, and the role of campaign efforts - or their absence.

Norms

We start by considering how voters view the prospect of crossover voting in normative terms. We note that voters often dislike usual campaign tactics or tactics that appear deceitful. Hussein et al. (2024) assesses support for crossover campaigning and finds that voters do not approve of co-partisan elites who meddle in opposing party primaries (a finding we echo in our first survey experiment). Gerber et al. (2017) shows that voters find it inappropriate for opposing partisans to vote in their party's primary elections. Markovits and Noel (2025) find that voters have strong normative objections to candidate selection procedures that violate the preferences of a majority of co-partisans, an outcome which crossover voting makes possible in congressional primaries.[2] What's more, public campaigns to institute open primaries have focused on open primaries' ability to enfranchise independent voters, not opposing partisans, such that these efforts are unlikely to change norms around the acceptability of crossover voting.

At the same time, voters display high levels of affective polarization. Most self-identified partisans strongly dislike the opposing party, at both the mass and elite level Iyengar et al. (2019). Crossover voting, even in open primary states, requires affiliating oneself with the opposing party - albeit by choosing to take a partisan ballot rather than by formally re-registering. This poses a challenge to voters who must contradict their affective partisan commitments in order to engage in crossover voting, undertaking psychological costs (Thornburg, 2023).

This affective cost of crossover voting also demonstrates how encouraging crossover voting may differ from standard "get out the vote" (GOTV) encouragements (Green and Gerber, 2019) which often emphasize social pressure dynamics by remarking on the public

[2]This type of disapproval may be more relevant to raiding (crossover voting and seeking to undermine the out-party's general election chances by supporting the out-party extremist) than hedging (crossover voting and supporting the out-party moderate whom a voter sincerely prefers) given its more fraught normative connotations. Our expectation is that hedging creates far smaller normative objections because it involves sincere voting, conditional of voting in an opposing party's primary.

nature of voter turnout records. It is imperative that treatments aimed at ameliorating these norms emphasize that crossover voting is socially sanctioned (perhaps by mentioning that co-partisans already engage in crossover voting) and seek to mitigate the stigma potential crossover voters might feel from taking the opposing party's ballot.

Electoral Context

We then consider the role of available candidates and the electoral environment. First, we note that voters choosing to vote in the other party's primary, whether they are hedging or raiding, are making a choice between two or more candidates on an actual ballot. The set of distinctions between opposing party primary candidates affects the motivation for crossover voting; if opposing partisan primary candidates are not sufficiently different from each other, would-be crossover voters might see little reason to turn out. The same is true even if opposing partisan primary candidates are sufficiently different from each other, but opposing partisans are either uninformed about those differences or exhibit sufficient animosity toward all opposing partisans such that they cannot discern those differences.

Second, the broader competitiveness and importance of both the primary and general election can affect the incidence of crossover voting. Existing experimental evidence argues that pivotality does not affect real world turnout choices (Enos and Fowler, 2014) and rational choice accounts hold that turnout increases during higher stakes elections predominately because elites make a higher effort to mobilize them (Aldrich, 1993). But older studies find crossover voting is more frequent when the general election is not expected to be competitive (Alvarez, 2002). More recently, prominent anecdotal examples of crossover voting have occurred in districts or states where the general election is a foregone conclusion and Huber et al. (2022) also finds that raising the perceived stakes of an election can increase turnout. This makes intuitive sense; prospective crossover voters are choosing between abstention and two mutually exclusive turnout choices. When the general election is not competitive, one of those primaries becomes a contest for choosing a sure general

election loser, decreasing the motivation to turn out to the disadvantaged party's primary and increasing the motivation to turn out to the advantaged party's primary and thereby increasing the incentive for opposing partisans to crossover.

We note, too, that the influence of general election competitiveness on crossover voting precludes much of the influence the relative competitiveness of the two primaries themselves would have. Voters may be drawn to voting in primaries that are competitive (though again, Enos and Fowler (2014) makes the opposite case). But if the general election is not competitive and both party's primaries are competitive, voters should still be motivated to vote in the advantaged party's primary, as the competitive disadvantaged party's primary is still inconsequential. Even if the general election is not competitive, the advantaged party's primary is not competitive but the disadvantaged party's primary is competitive, there is still little reason to vote in the disadvantaged party's primary. What's more, if the general election is competitive, voters are hesitant to crossover vote regardless of the primaries' relative competitiveness.

Finally, we consider that crossover voting on the basis of one race also means forgoing the opportunity to vote in one's own primary for other races. For example, a Democratic voter may live in a solid red congressional district, and so be motivated to cross over, but be dissuaded from doing so because their state legislative district is blue and they want to vote in the Democratic primary for that race. The complexity of these crosspressures increases quickly, as ballots include more races and as the partisanship of different administrative boundaries varies. Still, given the paucity of media coverage and voter knowledge about both primaries (Gerber et al., 2017) and lower level offices (Hopkins, 2018) separately, we believe these considerations are limited to concerns about forgoing one's vote in co-partisan primaries for House, Senate, Gubernatorial and Presidential offices.

Campaigns and Electioneering

Finally, we assess the role of campaign contact and standard GOTV encouragements. We note that most campaigns do not engage in efforts to promote crossover voting. Not only do candidates not contact opposing partisans, but they also refrain from contacting voters who are not habitual primary voters in their party's primary (Cohen, 2023). To the extent that voter turnout interventions are effective in primaries, this lacuna serves to crystallize a lack of crossover voting. The type of simple encouragement to crossover vote that we test is simply not part of the common repertoire of primary campaigning in America. Some evidence[3] even suggests that encouraging voters in one party to crossover can be risky. Encouraging crossover voting and hedging can cause backlash among co-partisan voters because it requires a campaign to frame itself as ideologically appealing to opposing partisans.[4]

Despite these difficulties, the normative and informational barriers to crossover voting we describe in prior sections are surmountable by campaigns. Existing GOTV efforts in primary and general elections work to overcome similar normative and informational challenges. Social pressure style messaging emphasizes the normative nature of voting and may serve to independently reduce the normative costs (by arguing for the popularity of a behavior thought previously stigmatized). Persuasive campaign messaging about candidates' policy stances and backgrounds highlight the differences between opposing party primary candidates' differences, attenuating informational barriers (Gerber et al., 2008). We test elites' ability to turnout crossover voters in both survey and field contexts with messaging designed to alleviate normative concerns (specifically, removing social stigma around crossover voting) and provide enough information about candidates for would-be crossover voters to make distinctions between them.

[3]Including message testing around crossover voting in the presidential primaries that was made available to the researchers privately

[4]Anecdotally, our partners on the field experiments described challenges in finding partisan campaign vendors willing to work on these efforts.

Study 1: Establishing Obstacles

Our first study is a pilot experiment to explore constraints on crossover voting and the effectiveness of a simplified bundled encouragement.[5] In other words, we ask: what prevents voters from crossing over at baseline, and will simple encouragements increase crossover voting? We also explore the incidence of hedging (voting for the sincerely preferred moderate out party candidate) vs. raiding (voting for the extreme out party candidate to undermine the out party's general election chances) among those who do crossover.

Method

Our online experiment surveys 1,492 Democratic (and Democratic-leaning) respondents in open primary states[6] and presents each respondent with two pairs of hypothetical candidates running in each party's congressional primary in their district. Each candidate is presented in a profile, and each candidate pair contains one ideological moderate and one ideological extremist.[7] For the pair of Republican primary candidates, one candidate expressed anti-democratic attitudes and the other did not.

Respondents were then randomly assigned to one of two treatment conditions using simple random assignment. After reading all four candidate profiles, respondents were either presented with a placebo condition that underlined low turnout in primary elections and encouraged them to "do their civic duty" to vote in both primary and general elections; or

[5]This survey was preregistered at https://osf.io/tdr63.

[6]In recent cycles, Democratic party elites have been more active than Republican elites in attempting to sway the results of out-party primaries. Likewise, Democratic voters have engaged in more hedging behavior than Republican voters. Because of this, we first investigate crossover voting among Democrats. Because we are testing encouragement to crossover vote, not encouragement to switch party registration, we narrow our sample to Democrats in open primary states. While the costs to crossover voting are significantly lower in open primary states, we can think of the results from this pilot survey as a proof of concept: if encouragement to crossover vote is ineffective in states where it is easiest to do so, it is likely ineffective elsewhere.

[7]Candidate ideology is denoted by a half dozen issues described in a brief summary of the candidate's positions.Candidate profiles can be found in the appendix, but were chosen to increase external validity, and so were based on real 2022 congressional primary candidates in competitive primaries (races in which multiple candidates raised more than $100,000) in which no incumbent was running. Profiles were constructed from language from campaign websites backdated to before the primary election.

presented with a bundled encouragement treatment that emphasized both the pro-normative and social pressure aspects of crossover voting identified by Gerber et al. (2017). Specifically, treatment informed respondents that any voter could vote in the Republican primary, that many Democratic leaders encouraged Democrats to do so, and that many Democrats did vote in the Republican primary to "stop dangers MAGA Republicans" who pose a threat to democracy from winning primaries. This treatment underlined the differences between candidates, emphasized that crossover voting is a socially acceptable behavior, and included encouragement from in-party elites that would both decrease the in-party primary's salience and perhaps reduce the affective barriers to crossing over. Neither treatment nor placebo made mention of primary elections for other races that were also on the ballot. After receiving treatment and placebo, respondents answer questions about whether they would cross over and their attitudes about hedging and raiding, and an open ended question about their attitudes towards crossover voting.

Results

To see baseline levels of crossover voting and acceptance of voting in the opposing party's primary, we first explore responses in the placebo group. As expected, very few voters choose to crossover vote at baseline; only 9% of respondents in the placebo group said they would vote in the Republican primary when presented with Republican and Democratic primary candidates and no prompting to vote in one primary or the other. The respondents who are willing to crossover vote are less affectively polarized and more educated.

If respondents were forced to crossover vote in the Republican primary, 80% prefer the pro-democratic, moderate candidate, corroborating scholarship that holds crossover voters overwhelmingly prefer to hedge and so are likely to support the more moderate candidate. What's more, only 3.4% of respondents agree that "[w]hen Republicans are picking a candidate, it is better when they pick an extremist because that candidate is less likely to win the general election," or, in other words, endorse raiding. But though hedging is more

widespread than raiding, hedging behavior is still not widely accepted. Using a scale of 1 to 10 (with 1 being very inappropriate behavior and 10 being very appropriate), only 13.8% of respondents placed in placebo said donating to moderate Republican primary candidates was a 5 or above, only 28.7% said supporting anti-Trump Republicans in primaries was a 5 or above, and only 21.2% said voting in Republican primaries was a 5 or above. Though there is a consequential minority of Democratic voters willing to vote in Republican primaries, and likely to engage in hedging when they do, these behaviors are not mainstream.

Responses to an open-ended prompt asking respondents their thoughts on crossover voting, shown in Figure 1, illuminate what keeps these rates of baseline crossover voting and acceptance of crossover behavior so low. Among those in placebo who did not crossover in the hypothetical primary, the vast majority of voters can see the benefits of crossing over, saying that they understand the logic of crossing over and see it as a way to protect against extremists. However, sizable portions of these respondents raise normative concerns about crossover voting (that they want to vote sincerely, or they think crossover voting is not fair). They also cite affective barriers: that they cannot stomach supporting any opposing partisan, even when the hypothetical candidates differ significantly on policy, and that they do not want to help the opposing party nominate an attractive candidate.

But can encouragement to crossover and hedge prompt voters to overcome these barriers to vote in Republican primaries and view intervening in the opposing primary as more acceptable? The estimated effects of our encouragement on acceptance of and willingness to crossover vote are shown in Table 1.[8] Treatment encouraging respondents to vote in the Republican primary to keep extremist candidates from winning increases support for hedging behaviors like donating to Republican primary candidates and voting in Republican primaries by 0.63 on a ten point scale. Treatment also increases willingness to vote in a hypothetical Republican congressional primary by 8.6 percentage points, nearly doubling the

[8]These estimates are covariate-adjusted, and the covariates were selected prior to data collection and specified in the PAP.



Figure 1: Open-ended responses on crossover voting among non-crossover voters in the placebo condition

Table 1: Treatment Effects for Main Outcome Variables

	Hedge Behavior Support (5 pt scale)	Rep. Primary Turnout	Vote for Moderate
Treated	0.619***	0.088***	0.004
	(0.125)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Num.Obs.	1401	1426	1426
R2	0.048	0.040	0.005
Std.Errors	IID	IID	IID

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Models include demographic covariates

percentage of respondents who say they would engage in crossover voting. Treatment also does not increase support for the pro-democracy candidate in the hypothetical Republican primary, but this is likely because support for the pro-democracy candidate is already so high that we are encountering ceiling effects.

This pilot study provided evidence that (1) there is a small portion of voters already participating in crossover behavior, (2) there are sizable portions of eligible voters who do not crossover vote but are not inherently opposed to such behaviors (3) normative beliefs about the acceptability of crossover voting, affective animosity toward the opposing party, and difficulty in drawing distinctions between opposing party candidates inhibit more voters from crossing over, and (4) simple encouragements can drastically increase rates of crossover voting and acceptance of crossover behavior.

Study 2: Strategic Context

In our second study, we used a modified candidate-choice conjoint experiment to explore the role of "candidates on the menu" in encouraging crossover voting. In our first experiment, we presented a *best case* for crossover voting with two Republican candidates who differed on *all issues* spanning both commitment to democracy and traditional policy moderation, and only asked respondents to choose in which primary to vote for one race. Now we vary

to what extent candidates in the opposing party primary differ. We also consider the role of the broader electoral environment, specifically the general election competitiveness of the seat for which voters are considering crossover turnout to see if voting in the advantaged party's primary is more attractive as the general election is less competitive.[9]

Method

To do so, we field an online conjoint experiment through Prolific to 2,055 respondents across both parties in open primary states during a period during or immediately after most states primary elections. After a series of pre-treatment demographic and attitudinal measures, respondents viewed seven vignettes, each with two candidates in the opposing party's primary, with independently randomized features. The randomized features were: candidate race, candidate gender, four issue positions, and the competitiveness of the general election. Each vignette resembled a traditional candidate choice conjoint with one major variation: candidate attributes were presented as deviations from a "party-line" baseline, in which the baseline is that both candidates agree on an issue and both hold an ideologically extreme opinion.[10] This baseline reflects many real world primaries where no high-profile candidate holds a clearly moderate position (especially common in districts in which the general election is not competitive). For the *General Election Competitive* attribute, the baseline is the respondent's party has no chance to win the general election while the competition level suggests that either party can win the general election. Respondents were then asked to choose between the two candidates and to choose whether to vote in the opposing party's primary or their own. This allows us to estimate the causal effect of moderation on each issue attribute on both the decision to engage in crossover voting and on moderate candidate choice in the opposing-party primary.

[9] As discussed earlier, the relative competitiveness of the two primaries does not influence crossover voting or lack thereof because of the theorized influence of general election competitiveness and so we do not vary it here.

[10] Figure 5 in the appendix shows an election profile that could be shown to a Democratic respondent.



Figure 2: Dems in Rep Primary



Figure 3: Reps in Dem Primary

We analyze results at the task level, with standard errors clustered at the respondent level. All results are estimates of the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of an attribute compared to its baseline on the respondent's likelihood of selecting the moderate out-party candidate (for choice models) and turning out in the opposing party's primary (for turnout models). While two candidates are featured in each profile, the randomization of attributes is at the level of the hypothetical election so we treat the results like a single profile candidate choice conjoint.

Results

Figures 2 and 3 present results by outcome and respondent party. Specifically, they present four sets of estimated effects of each attribute compared to a reference level for (1) Democrats voting in the Republican primary, (2) Democrats choosing between Republican candidates, (3) Republicans voting in the Democratic Primary, and (4) Republicans choosing between Democratic candidates.

In Figures 2 and 3, we show that respondents of both parties shift their candidate preferences and their stated turnout intention in response to randomly varied vignette

attributes. For Democrats, having a Republican primary candidate express a moderate position on abortion, loyalty to Trump, and claims of election fraud increases their propensity to crossover vote, and increases their support for the more moderate candidate. For Republicans, having a Democratic primary candidate express a moderate position on immigration, police and Supreme Court packing increases their propensity to crossover vote, and increases their support for the more moderate candidate. The similarities between the direction and sizes of the effects for Democratic and Republican respondents also suggest that crossover voting operates similarly across party.

These effects, particularly that the existence of an out-party candidate with more moderate positions increases crossover behavior, suggests that voters are able to distinguish between out-partisan candidates when the menu of options is varied. This suggests that low rates of crossover voting at baseline are in part a product of a dearth of sufficient variation and moderation among primary candidates.

For respondents of both parties, the effects of all four candidate issue positions operate similarly for crossover voting and support for the moderate candidate, providing strong evidence that voters have little appetite for raiding. When voters are enticed to turn out to the opposing primary, they are also enticed to support the more moderate candidate.

Consistent with our expectations, a competitive general election dramatically lowers propensity to crossover vote for Democrats and Republicans compared to an election where the respondent's party has no chance of winning and as a result, the respondent's party's own primary matters little. Competitive general elections, however, do not induce a change in support for the moderate candidate, again bolstering our conclusion that voters hedge when they crossover. In fact, if voters had an appetite for raiding, they would be most likely to do so in competitive general elections, when the out-party nominating an extremist would most improve their party's chance of winning the general, which would yield a negative estimated effect. Instead, the null effect on moderate support when general elections are competitive

further underlines that primary voters vote sincerely, even when they are crossing over.

Finally, while we acknowledge the limited external validity of this survey experimental context, we note the magnitude of these effects are quite large. A candidate having only *one* more moderate issue position increases the likelihood of crossover voting by 5 and 15 percentage points. A candidate shifting a handful of positions on highly salient policies to moderate positions can - in this artificial context - shift preferences and turnout by excess of 30 percentage points.

Our conjoint suggests that the set of candidates in a primary strongly influences crossover voting - as does the competitiveness of the general election in a district. And a substantial share of the reluctance to crossover vote may be explained by the absence of high-profile candidates who are sufficiently appealing to opposing partisans in districts where crossover voting is possible and attractive. The lack of moderate primary candidates and the low level of crossover voting at baseline are also mutually reinforcing: with few moderate candidates running, crossover voting is rare, which narrows the path to victory for moderate candidates, making them less likely to run (Hall, 2019). Campaigns could work to overcome this cycle by highlighting their candidate's moderate positions, especially when appealing through paid, targeted, communications to would-be crossover voters.

Study 3: Texas Field Experiment

Now we turn to test the efficacy of encouragements to crossover vote in real primary elections. In a third experiment, we partnered with a Political Action Committee to test whether encouragements to crossover vote increase the incidence of Democratic voters turning out to Republican primary elections, conducting a randomized control trial (RCT) in two Texas congressional districts (TX-12 and TX-23) in the lead-up to the 2024 Republican primary elections.[11]

[11]This experiment was pre-registered at: https://osf.io/82zvj.

This experiment tests the efficacy of encouragement in a setting in which crossover voting was an attractive option. In both districts, the Republican nominee was overwhelmingly likely to win the general election, making the Republican primary decisive. In both districts, relatively moderate and well-funded Republicans ran against at least one extremist challenger. In TX-23, the moderate candidate was incumbent Tony Gonzalez. In TX-12 the moderate candidate, Craig Goldman, was running in an open race. Still, Texas presents real world obstacles to crossover voting. Namely, in 2024, Texas anticipated a somewhat competitive general election for Senate, and had a competitive Democratic primary to choose Ted Cruz's challenger. As a result of having multiple races on the same primary ballot, voters faced an increased cost of crossing over.

Method

Texas has a semi-open primary system, in which voters unaffiliated with a political party can choose in which primary to vote. As a result, our experimental universe for potential crossover voters to the Republican primary is unaffiliated voters in two Texas congressional districts who are modeled by Catalist as likely to identify as Democrats and support Democrats in the general election. Specifically, the experimental universe includes households in the two congressional districts that had between one and four undeclared voters who had at least one valid phone number and mailing address, voted in at least one general election between 2016 and 2023, did not vote in the Republican primary elections in 2018, 2020 and 2022, and had a VCI (vote choice index) of between 30-70 (the Catalist measure of the probability of voting for a Democratic candidate in the general election). This produced a total of 196,434 voters in 160,800 households.

These voters were cluster randomized at the household level to be in one of two treatment conditions or control. Treatment was also block-randomized at the district level, with 17,500 households assigned to each treatment group in each congressional district.

Within each treated household, one individual was randomly assigned to be directly treated.[12]

Selected voters in treated households could receive one of two treatments: encouragements to crossover via three text messages, or encouragements to crossover via three text messages and two mailers. The content of all encouragements were in line with those of the survey experiments: the stakes of the primary are high, crossover voting is legal, many voters already cross over, and a moderate candidate is running in the primary.[13] Importantly, these interventions were remarkably "light touch," contacting voters only a few times. This intervention was also significantly cheaper than other GOTV efforts; our partner organization spent \$0.09 per text and \$1 per mailer, or \$3.37/voter in the text and mailer condition and \$0.27/vote in the text condition.

We report the estimated effects of encouragements on turnout to the Republican primary (i.e. crossover voting), the Democratic primary, and overall turnout at the household level.[14] Models are adjusted with pre-registered covariates[15] and include a control for the block-level covariate (congressional district) to prevent bias in the estimate.

Results

Table 2 shows the estimated effect of any voter in a household receiving encouragements to crossover vote in the Republican primary on turnout among all voters in that household. Encouragements to crossover vote significantly increased turnout to the Republican primary among Democratic-leaning voters by 0.5 percentage points, if treated using only three texts,

[12]This design created differential probability of household assignment across districts, and differential probabilities of individual assignment across districts and households. We account for this by using inverse probability weights in analyses focused on individual treatment assignment and analyzing one voter and multi-voter households separate. More details about the IPWs and analyses of individual treatment effects are in the appendix.

[13]Specific intervention materials can be found in the appendix.

[14]We pre-registered analyses that estimated the effect of treatment on the level of an individual voter, accounting for differential odds of assignments to treatment with inverse probability weights. These analyses, and the IPWs, can be found in the appendix. For parsimony, we only report household-level effects.

[15]Vote Choice Index (a measure of partisan vote probability), Age, Gender, Estimated Race/Ethnicity (provided by Catalist), past turnout

and 0.7 percentage points, if treated with those texts and two mailers. Even with the low number of voters treated across the two districts, treatment generated 513 crossover voters to the Republican primary. Though they yield only a few voters when compared to total turnout in these primaries, these treatment effects are remarkable for two reasons; first, treatment had a significant effect on turnout for the entire household even when only one voter was treated and when multi-voter households make up about a third of our experimental universe; and second, these effects were generated from a very small intervention. Only three short text messages induced a significant increase not just in turnout but in the unconventional and stigmatized behavior of crossover voting.

Table 2: Treatment Effects for TX-12 and TX-23, Household Level Assignment

	Rep Turnout	Dem Turnout	Any Turnout
Phone Only	0.005***	0.003*	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Phone + Mail	0.007***	0.002	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Num.Obs.	196 434	196 434	196 434
R2	0.008	0.274	0.183
Std.Errors	by: Household	by: Household	by: Household

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Models include demographic covariates

Treatment also increased turnout to the Democratic primary significantly, albeit by less than it did for crossover voting. This tentatively suggests that crossover voting encouragements mobilize at least some would-be Democratic abstainers. Treatment also increased overall turnout proportional to increases in both parties' primaries.

We next consider whether crossover voting - or some form of previously atypical primary participation - may be habit-forming. Coppock and Green (2016) show that voting in a single election increases propensity to vote in subsequent elections (especially of the same type that was initially encouraged). We extend this form of analysis to the Texas Republican congressional primary runoff elections and explore downstream effects of our treatment on

turnout in the primary runoffs that occurred three months after the initial primary and the administering of treatment.[16] In both TX-12 and TX-23, the moderate candidate and an extreme candidate advanced to a run off election, again providing strong incentive for voters to crossover. Given the novelty of crossover voting to most participants, these results give insight into whether one-off encouragements can have long-running effects on a previously rare form of voter behavior.

In Figure 4, we show that our treatment likely increased turnout even in the runoff three months later, though these estimates are not statistically significant. The pooled model compared households with any treatment condition to pure control, with this effect 0.12 percentage points ($p = .18$), while the household assignment model disaggregated the phone, and phone plus mail treatments. Though substantively small, these effects are directionally as expected. While the effect of encouragements are attenuated in the context of runoffs, between 10% and 20% of the increased turnout is preserved in an obscure subsequent election nearly three months later. While this persistence result might be unsurprising in normal efforts to encourage voter turnout, the fraught normative nature of crossover voting accentuates the importance of these results: some voters responded to treatment by embracing an unusual behavior and continuing it over multiple elections separated by a period of months.

[16]Texas requires primary winners to win a majority of the vote; if winners only earn a plurality, the top two candidates compete in a runoff. The original primary was held on March 5, 2024 while the run off was held on May 28, 2024.



Figure 4: Treatment Effect Estimates for Runoff Turnout, Household Level Assignment

Study 4: Missouri Field Experiment

Study 4 is a replication of Study 3 in a Democratic Primary in Missouri's 1st congressional district.[17] This time, we explored the willingness of likely Republican voters to crossover to vote in the Democratic Primary in Missouri. This primary displayed Democrats with large ideological differences; then-Representative Cori Bush was a stridently progressive member of the so-called "squad", while District Attorney Wesley Bell launched a challenge from the ideological center and was supported by outside spending by groups supporting moderate and pro-Israel candidates. The Democratic nominee in this district is nearly assured to win the general election, again creating compelling circumstances to crossover vote. In this case, though candidates for Senate were also on the primary ballot, crossover voting was not more costly because of it; the Republican incumbent Josh Hawley was unchallenged in the primary and nearly assured general election victory.

Method

Our experimental method is nearly identical to that of the Texas field experiment. Unlike Texas, Missouri has fully open primaries, such that any voter can vote in any primary. Our experimental universe, then, is registered voters in MO-1 modeled to be independents or Republicans[18] who have not voted in a Democratic primary in 2022 or 2020. In all, our experimental universe contained 51,685 individuals living in 41,609 households.

This experiment had only one treatment condition, four text messages encouraging turnout to the Democratic primary, assigned at the individual voter level, not the household level. Treatment was block-randomized, though, based on an individual voters' modeled partisanship (independent or Republican) and past voting history (specifically, whether the voter had turned out to no elections in 2020 and 2022, whether the voter had turned out to

[17] This study was preregistered at https://osf.io/jnzmq.

[18] Note that we cannot target registered Republicans because Missouri has no partisan registration. Instead, we used modeled partisanship as provided by our voter file vendor, L2. 80% of voters in our experimental universe were modeled Republicans while only 20% were modeled independents.

only general elections in 2020 and 2022, or whether the voter had turned out to primaries and generals in 2020 and 2022).[19]

We report the estimated effects of encouragement on turnout to the Democratic primary (i.e. crossover voting), the Republican primary, and overall turnout on the individual level. Models are adjusted with pre-registered covariates[20] and control for block to prevent bias in the estimate. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.

Results

Table 3 reports estimate treatment effect of encouragements to vote in Democratic primary on turnout among independent and Republican voters. Contrary to our expectations and prior results, our experimental encouragement failed to increase turnout in the Democratic Primary and had a negative, though near-zero and imprecisely estimated, turnout effect. In contrast, treatment appeared to modestly increase turnout in the Republican Primary and also increased turnout in third-party primaries, such that the overall turnout effect was positive, albeit with unintentional effects. Despite consistent evidence that encouragements induce turnout to the opposing party's primary, a near identical electoral context[21] and treatments proved effective in other experimental interventions, efforts to mobilize Republican and independent voters to vote in the Democratic primary were unsuccessful. This may suggest that Republicans are less responsive to these types of mobilization efforts or face higher psychological barriers to crossing over than Democrats, though the specifics of the treatment and context may also be responsible.

[19] In total, there were six blocks: independents who did not vote, independents who only voted in generals, independents who voted in primaries and generals, Republicans who did not vote, Republicans who only voted in generals, and Republicans who voted in primaries and generals.

[20] Gender, modeled education, and past voter turnout.

[21] And, if anything, more favorable context given that Republicans were unlikely to feel urgency to vote in an uncontested Senate primary

Table 3: Treatment Effects, Household Level Assignment

	Dem Primary	Rep Primary	Any Primary
Treated	−0.001	0.004	0.007+
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Num.Obs.	50 831	50 831	50 831
R2	0.025	0.336	0.359
Std.Errors	by: Household	by: Household	by: Household

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Models include demographic covariates

Discussion

Our results suggest the existence of multifarious barriers to crossover voting: normative concerns, knowledge of electoral rules, and the set of candidates running (and attracting media attention) in opposing party primaries. We also explore solutions related to messaging, candidates, and get-out-the-vote efforts. Across both survey and field experiments, we find that modified forms of standard encouragements to turnout, changes to the set of available candidates, and to the strategic context of primaries shape voter willingness to engage in crossover voting. In the field, we find some evidence that these encouragements may be more attractive to prospective Democratic crossover voters. Crossover voting has the potential to drastically change primary electorates, but the status quo provides few incentives for crossover voting in most primaries.

These findings contribute to a broader literature regarding institutional reform and primary elections. Though numerous primary reforms have widened the pool of eligible primary voters in the hopes of changing (and perhaps, moderating) primary outcomes, reforms have not brought about their anticipated results. We provide evidence that one reason institutional change struggles to produce changes in outcomes is because voters do not take advantage of their voting eligibility without prompting. The lack of crossover voting in existing primary elections is not an inevitability but a result of contextual features of most congressional campaigns and an unwillingness to encourage crossover voting on behalf of

candidates and their allies. And when campaigns invest in recruiting crossover voters by alleviating their informational and normative barriers, campaigns can turn out opposing partisans with very little cost.

That is not to say our results point to easy solutions to expanding the realized electorate in open primary states. Candidates that encourage partisans of the other party to participate in their primary may face backlash if co-partisan voters dislike a candidate that garners support from opposing partisans. However, candidates who appeal to these voters by being ideologically distinct from their primary opponents and by contacting would-be crossover voters engage in a virtuous cycle. Our evidence suggests that crossover voting may be habit-forming, such that a moderate candidate in one election who solicits voters to crossover paves the way for increased support of moderate candidates in future primaries.

The current equilibrium in which candidates do not consider opposing partisans as potential voters, contributes to the polarizing pressures of primaries and the *de facto* disenfranchisement of large swaths of partisan voters. Broadly, our research suggests that the large pool of eligible voters who do not turnout in the primary of the party with which they do not identify can be mobilized, but complex interactions between voter normative beliefs, available candidates, and primary strategies affect whether crossover voting is likely in any given primary election.

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Appendix

Contents

0.1 Study 1

0.1.1 Democratic Candidate Profiles

1. Philip Shore is running for Congress to fight for the middle class and those working hard to join it. As state treasurer, Philip helped pass the Reproductive Privacy Act that codified Roe v. Wade into state law. Philip also stands for securing a path to citizenship for Dreamers and raising taxes on the ultra-wealthy and corporations.

2. Zachary Miller is the only candidate in this election who has been fighting against corporate special interests and political corruption on the local, state, and national levels for 20 years. Zachary has advanced progressive policies. In Washington, Zachary will fight to secure a woman's right to choose no matter what, raise taxes on corporations and the wealthy and give the IRS the resources to make them pay.

0.1.2 Republican Candidate Profiles

1. Nicholas Smith believes that the American people are the greatest "checks and balances" against government abuses of power. Too much partisanship and radical division has weakened our great nation. Nicholas intends to be a voice of the people, by the people, and for the people. That includes accepting the choice of the American people in the 2020 presidential election and moving on to create the policies Americans want: lower taxes on businesses, secure borders and increased immigration of skilled laborers, and limiting late term abortions.

2. Peter Summers fought in the state legislature for our conservative values. As the most conservative member of the state legislature, fighting for what's right is what he does. Now, we need strong conservative fighters like Donald J. Trump in Washington that will always put America First. That's who Peter is and what he'll continue to do. In Washington, Peter will insist on full forensic audit in every state's 2020 election results to uncover the fraud that led to President Trumps "defeat," secure our borders and

deport illegal immigrants, remove stifling government oversight on corporations, and ban abortions.

0.1.3 Placebo Language

Primaries are important elections that determine which candidates advance to the general election. Despite this, only about 20% of eligible voters cast ballots in the last primary election. Make sure that next election, you do your civic duty and vote in both the primary and the general election.

0.1.4 Treatment Language

Primaries are important elections that determine which candidates advance to the general election. In this primary, any voter, not just those who are registered Republicans, can vote in the Republican primary. Many Democrats choose to vote in Republican primaries and Democratic leaders have called on voters to stop dangerous MAGA Republicans from winning primaries. There is a difference between disagreeing on policy and seeking to undermine our democratic system. It is important to vote against the anti-democratic candidate, regardless of which primary they run in.

0.2 Study 2

This is election 1 of 7. Below is some information about the two candidates, Candidates A and B, in this **Republican primary election for the House of Representatives**:

	Candidate Positions
Race	Candidate A is white and Candidate B is a minority
Gender	Candidate A is male and Candidate B is female
Abortion Policy	Both candidates are committed to protecting unborn life by banning abortion
Russia Policy	Both candidates support America first foreign policy that doesn't send American dollars overseas
Election Policy	Both candidates want to investigate the stolen 2020 election and end mail-in voting
Trump Support	Both candidates are proud supporters of President Trump

At the same time, there is a **Democratic primary election for this House of Representatives seat** that will pick the Democrat who runs in the general election. Experts expect the general election for this House of Representatives seat to be decided by only a few percentage points.

Figure 5: Conjoint Experiment Election Profile for a Democrat being Asked About a Republican Primary

0.3 Study 3

IPW Odds

From our pre-analysis plan the following text describes the randomization procedure and probabilities for each unit to be assigned to each condition. We weight our regressions using inverse probability weights given the varying probability of each individual undeclared voter of being assigned to treatment. This probability varies by household size. For example, an undeclared voter in a household that only has one undeclared voter has a 17,500/total households in their congressional district probability of being assigned to each treatment condition. However, if that undeclared voter lives in a house with another undeclared voter, their probability of being assigned to each treatment condition is 17,500/total households in their congressional district * .5. More generally, when N = the total number of households in our sample in a given congressional district, and H = the number of undeclared voters in a given household, any given undeclared voter V has a probability of being assigned to each treatment condition as:

$$V_i = 17,500/N_i * 1/H_i$$

The odds of being assigned to the spillover of each condition for voter i in household of size H_i is:

$$V_i = 17,500/N_i * (H_i - 1)/H_i$$

0.3.1 Intervention Materials

Texts

1. Do you want your neighbors to decide your (and your children's) future? If not, you must vote now in the primary election; this vote is WAY more powerful than your November vote. MOST Texas elections are decided in the primaries. Every Texas registered voter can vote in the primary. Just show up; no party registration required.

Vote Early thru 3/1. Primary Election Day is 3/5. (SENT 2/26/24)

2. John, remember that WHETHER you vote is public record even though who you vote for is your business. Show your friends, neighbors and elected officials that you are a Primary Election Voter whose choices matter. Every registered Texas voter can vote in the primary election on Tuesday, March 5th. Just show up; no party registration required. Don't lose this chance to make your voice heard. Vote Early ends Tomorrow 3/1. Primary Election Day is 3/5. Find where to vote here: [link]. Reply Stop to end. (SENT 2/29/24)

3. John, FYI, Primary Election Day is tomorrow, March 5th. Re-elect [Tony Gonzales/Craig Holdman], a man of Integrity, to be your US Representative in the Republican primary. Elect a Uniter, not a Divider. Whoever wins this primary will most likely be your next US Representative. Every registered Texas voter can vote in the primary. Just show up; no party registration required. Polling location links can be found here. (link) Picture of the candidate. Reply Stop to end. (SENT 3/4/24)

Mailers



Figure 6: Mailer sent to Mail-Treated Voters in TX-23

Figure 7: Mailer sent to Mail-Treated voters across both districts

0.3.2 Individual Treatment Effects

Table 4: Treatment Effects, Individual Assignment, 1 Voter Households

	Rep Turnout	Dem Turnout	Any Turnout
Phone + Mail	0.008***	0.003+	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Phone Only	0.008***	0.004*	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Num.Obs.	130 315	130 315	130 315
R2	0.008	0.065	0.048
Std.Errors	by: cluster	by: cluster	by: cluster

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Models include demographic covariates

0.3.3 Heterogeneous Effects

Table 5: Treatment Effects, Individual Assignment, 2+ Voter Households

	Rep Turnout	Dem Turnout	Any Turnout
Phone + Mail	0.008*	0.002	0.010+
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Spillover Phone + Mail	0.003	−0.001	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Phone Only	0.003	0.009*	0.012*
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Spillover Phone Only	−0.001	0.004	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Num.Obs.	66 119	66 119	66 119
R2	0.008	0.083	0.063
Std.Errors	by: cluster	by: cluster	by: cluster

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Models include demographic covariates

Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects by Standardized Partisanship Score

	Rep Turnout	Dem Turnout	Any Turnout
Phone + Mail	0.010	−0.008	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Spillover Phone + Mail	−0.013	−0.040**	−0.056**
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Phone Only	0.006	−0.005	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Spillover Phone Only	−0.013	−0.057***	−0.071***
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.019)
VCI_sd	−0.009***	0.032***	0.023***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Phone + Mail:VCI_sd	0.000	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Phone + Mail Spill:VCI_sd	0.004	0.009*	0.013**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Phone:VCI_sd	0.000	0.003	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Phone Spill:VCI_sd	0.003	0.014***	0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Num.Obs.	196 434	196 434	196 434
R2	0.008	0.075	0.056
Std.Errors	by: cluster	by: cluster	by: cluster

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Models include demographic covariates

Table 7: Heterogeneous Effects of Any Treatment by VCI Quartile

	Dependent variable:		
	Any Turnout	Republican Primary	Democratic Primary
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Directly Treated	0.007**	0.007***	0.0004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Spill Over treated	−0.020***	−0.005	−0.015***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)
VCI 2nd Quart.	0.011***	−0.008***	0.019***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
VCI 3rd Quart.	0.029***	−0.017***	0.045***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
VCI 4th Quart.	0.063***	−0.022***	0.083***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Direct * VCI 2nd Quart.	0.003	−0.001	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Direct * VCI 3rd Quart	0.008	0.001	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Spill * VCI 2nd Quart.	0.018***	0.007	0.012**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Spill * VCI 3rd Quart.	0.035***	0.014***	0.021***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Spill*VCI 4th Quart	0.037***	0.008*	0.028***
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Observations	194,466	194,466	194,466
R^2	0.058	0.008	0.078
Adjusted R^2	0.058	0.008	0.078
Residual Std. Error (df = 194436)	0.638	0.450	0.485
F Statistic (df = 29; 194436)	412.387***	54.284***	569.188***

Note: All models include covariate adjustment for race, age, gender, and block and IPWs.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01